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Since  its  inception  in  the  Canadian 
agricultural  policy  landscape,  supply 
management  in  the  dairy  sector  has 
generated  interest  from  various 
stakeholders.  The  system  has  been 
severely  criticized  by  opponents  and 
strongly  defended  by  proponents, 
both  within  and  outside  of  Canada. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  changes  to 
supply  management  may  be  difficult 
to achieve, especially from a political 






Nevertheless,  our  assessment  is  that 
dairy  supply  management  needs  to 
take  further  steps  to  improve  its 
flexibility and efficiency. The approach 
focuses on an examination of Canada’s 
dairy  policy  from  within  which  will 
hopefully  initiate  a  constructive 
dialogue  among  stakeholders  of  the 






At a Glance 
  The aim of this paper is to initiate a constructive dialogue among stakeholders in the industry that will 
enable the Canadian dairy value chain to improve its efficiency.  
  Canada is not unique; characteristics of the dairy sector, notably coordination problems, have led many 
countries to intervene in their dairy industries to varying degrees.  
  Supply management currently faces important internal and external pressures including access to quota, 
structural surpluses, the use of dairy ingredients and international trade negotiations. 
  We propose three specific strategies to help stakeholders address some identified pressures: adapt 
provincial and regional structures to national ones, change processor’s incentive in order to reduce solid 
non-fat surplus and identify export opportunities. 
Since its inception in the Canadian agricultural policy landscape, supply management in the dairy sector has 
generated a great deal of debate. The system essentially limits the supply of dairy products to meet demand 
at a price based on cost of production and restricts imports of dairy products into Canada.  Critics of supply 
management  have  argued  that  it  should  be  dismantled  in  order  to  favour  economies  of  scale, 
competitiveness and to reap the benefits from trade in Canada’s dairy sector. Supporters contend that it 
reduces price volatility, increase farmers’ benefits and lowers transaction costs  – thereby ensuring that 
processors and consumers (taxpayers) are not worse off. 
It is also important to note that numerous supporters of supply management recognize that the current 
system requires some changes to enable it to operate more efficiently. In fact, since its inception some forty 
years ago, supply management has evolved considerably. These facts, combined with the pressure on supply 
management created by factors such as the ongoing global trade discussions and the growing use of non-
dairy substitutes imply that this is an appropriate time to move the discussion on Canadian dairy supply 
management forward.  
This  paper’s  objective  is  to  enhance  the  debate  on  Canadian  dairy  supply  management  with  facts  and 
suggestions aimed at initiating a constructive dialogue among stakeholders in the industry that will enable 
the Canadian dairy value chain to better prepare for the changes that are on the horizon.  
There is no doubt that changes to supply management may be difficult to achieve, especially from a political 
point of view. Nevertheless, our assessment is that dairy supply management needs to become more flexible 
and  efficient.  We  are  not  recommending  the  dismantling  of  supply  management.  As  a  result,  our 
recommendations might not satisfy some opponents of the system. However, one needs to recognize that 
while some stakeholders in the dairy supply chain are asking for changes, few are demanding a complete 
dismantling. Empirical evidences from recent world events (the 2009 dairy crisis), stress the need for the 
coordination of supply in the dairy sector. It appears to us that supply management can be a legitimate 
coordination tool. 
Executive Summary  
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Canada is not the only country that regulates its dairy industry 
A combination of the fixed resources present in the dairy industry, the significant lags between the time a 
decision is made in response to market signals and the time it takes to alter production, the perishability of 
the product and the short run incentive of producers to increase production in order to maintain revenues 
when price are declining have led many other countries to intervene in their dairy industries to varying 
degrees.  
Canada implemented a supply management program for the dairy industry in the early 1970s and has, 
therefore,  significant  intervention  in  its  dairy  sector  with  production  quotas,  import  restrictions  and  a 
support price based on the cost of production. By its nature, Canada’s dairy supply management is oriented 
towards the domestic market. Therefore, Canada does not export to a great degree and is a marginal player 
in international market. Supply is matched with demand at negotiated prices based on cost of production 
and price volatility is kept to a minimum.  
The United States and Europe both intervene heavily in their respective dairy industries with a combination 
of price supports, subsidies, purchases of surpluses, import restrictions and export subsidies. New Zealand 
and Australian dairy sectors benefit from a production structure that makes them among the lowest cost 
producers  in  the  world.  The  two  countries  are  also  major  players  on  the  international market.  In  fact, 
contrary to the vast majority of countries, their domestic consumption is much less important than their 
exports.  Dairy  sectors  in  both  countries  were  also  deregulated  and  receive  little  government  support. 
However, free market does not completely rule New Zealand’s industry since it has a co-operative processor 
that controls almost entirely the domestic market as well as New Zealand’s exports. On the other hand, 
Australia does not have a single buyer and seller for dairy and this might explain why the Australian dairy 
sector has struggled since total deregulation in 2000, especially compared with the situation in New Zealand.  
Canada’s supply management system has enabled dairy farmers to avoid the dairy crisis that other countries 
faced in 2008-2009. Canadian dairy farmers have also benefitted from higher prices than most of their 
counterparts  in  other  countries,  as  well  as  from  lower  price  volatility.  Moreover,  the  direct  costs  for 
governments in Canada are minimal compared with the situation in the United States and the EU. However, 
these advantages of supply management must be weighed against some of the disadvantages including the 
fact that dairy prices are, at least at some point in time, higher in Canada compared with the United States. 
This represents a cost born by consumers that is not captured in the direct cost of supply management. 
However, similar costs are born by taxpayers in the EU and the U.S. systems. 
Internal and External Pressures 
Supply management currently faces important internal and external pressures including access to quota, 
structural surpluses, the use of dairy ingredients and international trade negotiations.  
In the past few years, dairy farmers have encountered increased difficulties in obtaining additional quota in part 
because the rate of exit of farmers from the industry has slowed down, as has the move towards greater 
consolidation. These developments have sharply increased the cost of acquiring quota. In response to this rising 
quota price, a price cap has been implemented in numerous provinces. Once the cap is reached, quota is allocated 
on a demand basis with the result that only small quantities can be acquired over time by a single producer.  
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Thus, it reduces dairy farmers’ capability to reap the benefit from economies of scale. If this situation persists 
in the long run, it has the potential to affect the competitiveness of the whole dairy value chain. 
Technological development in dairy processing has increased to the point where dairy ingredients can be 
substituted for milk in order to increase yield. These dairy ingredients were, for the most part, not produced 
in Canada and were imported free of tariffs at low prices. At the same time, this development contributed to 
an increase in solids non-fat (SNF) structural surplus inherent in the Canadian system. The main issue now is 
how to transform the roughly 60 million kg of SNF (issued from our structural surplus) from a dead weight 
cost to a return for the industry.  
The most important external pressure that dairy supply management faces in Canada is the Doha trade talks. 
Current discussions involve various scenarios of greater market access and significant tariff reductions. A 
potential Doha outcome based on current draft modalities implies that foreign dairy products would have 
greater access to the Canadian market. In this situation, if farm prices are maintained, quota cuts would 
create important pressure on quota price. Another option would be to reduce farm milk prices, which might 
transpire in drops in quota prices. At this point, dairy farmers would be ill equipped to compete against 
European and Americans farmers that benefit from significant subsidies.  
An Open Dialogue is needed to initiate changes  
The challenges to supply management discussed above imply that, going forward, a constructive dialogue 
among stakeholders is crucial. Unfortunately, to date, this type of discussion has been difficult and the 
debate has often been dominated by rhetoric on both sides. To further support suggestions for change to the 
system, five points of view often presented to oppose supply management are discussed. This analysis sets 
the stage for some strategic suggestions to improve the effectiveness of the Canadian dairy sector going 
forward. 
Issue1: Because of supply management, consumption of dairy products is declining in Canada. 
It is a fact that milk consumption is declining in Canada. However, this is not unique to Canada and could be 
associated with a change in the mix of dairy products consumed by the public, which is influenced by income, 
demographics, culture and other factors. It is hard to blame supply management for a trend that is taking 
place throughout the developed world. 
Issue 2: Retail dairy product prices more expensive in Canada 
Statistical evidence suggests that dairy prices in Canada are less volatile compared with other countries. 
Although no exhaustive statistical analyses were performed, a spot survey of supermarkets indicates that in 
February 2011, dairy product prices were higher in Canada than in the United States. It should be noted that 
price differential between countries might also be affected by differences in processing and distribution 
structure, as well as by direct and indirect subsidies to dairy production in the US.  
Issue 3: Supply management generates little incentive to reduce costs at the farm 
Empirical evidence seems to indicate that dairy farmers in Canada currently have less incentive to lower 
costs compared with dairy farmers in non-supply managed countries like the United States.  
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Issue 4: Supply management is detrimental to dairy processors 
It could be argued that supply management limits competition thereby making it easier for processors to 
operate effectively in Canada. Nevertheless, processors face constraints such a regional allocation of milk, 
which can result in sub-optimal use of their capital investment as well as limiting growth of value-added dairy 
products.  
Issue 5: Canada is missing out on exports, especially on dairy consumption growth in developing countries 
Critics  of  supply  management  contend  that  the  system  prevents  dairy  farmers  in  Canada  from  taking 
advantage of export opportunities because it is geared towards the domestic market. However, what some 
of the critics overlook is the fact that it will always be difficult for Canada to compete on international 
markets with dairy farmers from New Zealand and Australia, for instance. The cost structure for farmers 
from these countries is lower because of extensive pasture-based production and minimal investment in 
infrastructure compared to Canada.  
While the opportunity to export commodity dairy products on the international market may be limited, there 
may be potential for products like higher value-added cheeses, especially to the U.S. market.  
Strategies Going Forward 
An understanding of the challenges and the evidence regarding some of the commonly held views on supply 
management have led us to put forward some strategies for the industry to consider going forward that 
would hopefully improve the efficiency of supply management.   
We suggest the following strategies:         
  To adapt provincial and regional structures to a national market: 
o  The creation of a national board, 
o  The creation of a national pool with a national allocation of milk on demand; 
o  The creation of a national centralized quota exchange for partial share of the MSQ. 
  To change processors incentives toward SNF surplus: 
o  The creation of a mechanism to share the cost of SNF surpluses between producers and 
processors over and above a certain level of surplus; 
o  To reduce processors margins for butter-powder and/or to create one for dairy ingredients; 
o  To change class pricing so that the use of Canadian dairy ingredients would not be priced at 
class 3a but would be more competitive with the price of potential substitutes. 
  To see Canadian dairy exports differently: 
o  To identify and explore ways to exploit value added export markets where Canada might 
have a competitive advantage; 
o  To coordinate and facilitate, in the short run, the effort of smaller fine cheese producers to 
penetrate the fine cheese market in the U.S., which is currently mostly deserved by French 
imports.  
  To increase dairy farmers’ revenues through an increase in pool price and volumes, instead of an 
increase in regular milk classes (class 1 to 4). This could be achieved through different combinations 








t a Glance 
 
The aim of this paper is to suggest strategies that we believe could help supply 
management operate more efficiently.  
Proponents and opponents of dairy supply management have used a great 
deal of rhetoric. In fact, the debate has not progressed much in the last 15 
years. 
Recent  events  and  structural  issues  suggest  that  this  seems  to  be  an 
appropriate time to move forward the discussion on Canadian dairy supply 
management. 
Since its inception in the Canadian agricultural policy landscape, supply management in 
the  dairy  sector  has  generated  a  lot  of  interest  from  various  stakeholders  such  as 
academics, the media and economists. This was especially true in the early 1990’s in the 
midst of global trade negotiations (Uruguay Round) that specifically targeted policies 
and trade protections that are the backbone of dairy supply management. Dairy has 
attracted most of the attention of academics and applied economists because of its 
importance, coupled with extensive data availability. Opponents have argued that the 
system should be dismantled in order to achieve economies of scale at the production 
level, lower prices for consumers and the enabling of farmers and processors to attain 
some  of  the  benefits  arising  from  international  trade.  Other  economists  in  North 
America  and  Europe,  as  well  as  dairy  producers,  have  argued  in  favor  of  supply 
management on the basis that it reduces price volatility, increases farmers’ benefits and 
lowers transaction costs – thereby ensuring that processors and consumers (taxpayers) 






The debate surrounding supply management has frequently involved a great deal of 
rhetoric, simplistic arguments and invalid and untested assumptions as highlighted in a 
recent  paper  by  the  George  Morris  Centre
1.  This  type  of  intervention  does  not 
contribute  to  a  dialogue  bet ween  proponents  and  opponents  of  dairy  supply 
management. In fact, the debate has not progressed much in the last 15 years, while 
both camps are claiming to defend the interests of the Canadian dairy value chain. 
Given the discussions on global trade in the current World Trade Organization round of 
negotiations, bilateral trade agreements and the domestic challenges that dairy supply 
management faces in Canada, this seems to be an appropriate time to move the 
discussion on Canadian dairy supply management f orward with some suggestions for 
changes to the system from within.  
This paper’s objective is to enhance the debate on Canadian dairy supply management 
with  facts  and  suggestions  aimed  at  initiating  a  constructive  dialogue  among 
stakeholders in the industry that will enable the Canadian dairy value chain to better 
prepare for the changes that are on the horizon.  
We start the analysis by presenting how we believe dairy sectors fits into economic 
theory; a brief review of dairy policies in different countries follows. Then, we identify 
important issues faced by the Canadian dairy sector. A policy discussion focusing on the 
areas that have resulted in misunderstandings over the years as well as suggestions are 
considered in the final section of the report. 
                                                      






The Origin of Supply Management:  How Dairy 
Sectors Fit in the Economic Theory 
 
 
t a glance 
 
The historical perspective on the Canadian dairy sector is not unique.    
At first, government intervention in the dairy industry in the US, Canada and 
Europe resulted in overproduction and growing government support. 
In Canada, the answer to costly government support and overproduction has 
been  the  implementation  of  a  supply  management  program  for  the  dairy 
industry in the early 1970s. 
Historical perspective 
To understand the origin and economic motivation for supply management policy, it is 
important to look at it from an historical perspective. This perspective, in fact, is not 
unique to Canada but applies to most dairy sectors in developed countries. Following 
World War II, dairy farms started to specialize, moving from self-sufficiency at the farm 
level to a market-oriented mindset. This resulted in a greater dependence on buyers, 
since  dairy  farmers’  standard  of  living  were  now  almost  solely  dependent  on  milk 
revenues. Dairy farmers were then at a market disadvantage since many of them were 
selling a highly perishable product to a few regional buyers. To partially counteract the 
market power of buyers, some dairy farmers decided to create dairy cooperatives and 







production was highly seasonal, price variations at the farm were important and two 
neighbors  delivering  the  same  quality  of  milk  could  receive  quite  different  prices, 
reflecting their relationship and their capability to negotiate with buyers.  
At the end of the sixties, Canada started to lose its privileged access to the UK dairy 
market following the decision by the UK to join the European Economic Community 
(1973). This resulted in farm milk surpluses in Canada, low prices and the need for costly 
support  from  the federal  government.  At  the same  time, the  Common  Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) of the European Economic Community supported dairy production with 
subsidies,  a  development  that  resulted  in  overproduction  and  growing  government 
support. It appears that dairy sectors need for coordination, that the market alone 
failed to provide, creates situations that result in government interventions in the form 
of budgetary support or a legislative support that favors coordination. 
Canada’s answer to the market coordination problem that generated costly government 
support and overproduction has been the implementation of a supply management 
program for the dairy industry in the early 1970s. Roughly ten years later Europe also 
implemented a similar system. It is also worth noting that in the U.S. a support price 
and Federal Milk Marketing Orders were put in place at the end of the 1930s, for similar 
reasons.  
In the 1980s, Europe and the U.S. were in the midst of a protracted subsidy war in 
agriculture, mostly involving cash crops. It is in this context that, for the first time, 
agriculture  was  included  in  global  trade  negotiations  (GATT-Uruguay  Round).  The 
inclusion  of  agriculture  was  motivated  by  government  budgetary  reasons,  but  also 
supported  by  a  general  trend  towards  market  liberalization  in  developed  countries 
(neoliberal  economic  school)
2. Although dairy supply management has little or no 
budgetary direct cost on governments, it was nevertheless linked to trade talk  
 
                                                      
2 Neoliberalism describes a market-driven approach to economic and social policy based on neoclassical 
theories of economics that stresses the efficiency of private enterprise, liberalized trade and relatively 
open markets, and therefore seeks to maximize the role of the private sector in determining the political 




Neoclassical theory and dairy supply management 
In the early 1990’s the Uruguay Round negotiations generated much interest among 
academics regarding alternative trade scenarios for the dairy industry. Following the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994, the interest level for dairy trade models 
decreased  given  that  the  agreement  had  a  limited  impact  on  the  dairy  industry. 
However,  the  negotiations  currently  under  way  with  the  World  Trade  Organization 
(WTO)  may  include  several  liberalization  scenarios  for  agriculture  that  could  greatly 
impact  the  dairy  industry,  a  development  that  has  renewed  interest  in  dairy  trade 
models. Those models can be classified in two broad categories, world trade models 
and regional trade models. The former have a high level of aggregation while the latter 
can be much more disaggregated and detailed. Moreover, each type of model is mostly 
static, although some have a proxy for supply and demand responses. Most of these 
models are, however, in a partial equilibrium setting (meaning that they do not take 
into account the impact on other sectors of the economy).  
Modeling  complex  interlinked  market  structures  implies  numerous  underlying 
assumptions  as  well  as  the  use  of  proxies  to  compensate  for  less  than  perfect  or 
unavailable  data.  A  modeling  exercise  enables  researchers  to  better  understand  an 
economic system and to assess the importance of various variables and links within the 
system. Thus, the exercise is often more important than the results given that a change 
of assumptions could drastically affect the results. Unfortunately, once model results 
are available, they are sometimes used by politicians, journalists and even academics as 
definite answers to complex questions instead of an indication of what might happen 
given a large set of assumptions. As an illustration, an interesting study published in the 
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics in 2008
3 presented a scenario
4 in which 
each Canadian could benefit from dairy trade liberalization and save roughly $35 in the 
first year that liberalization came into effect
5. On the other hand, each Canadian dairy 
                                                      
3 Abbassi, A., O. Bonroy, and Gervais, J-P., "Dairy Trade Liberalization Impacts in Canada". Canadian 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 56(2008):313-335. 
4 Scenario 1. 
5 The study has aggregated processors, retailers and consumers in «buyers». It is therefore the equivalent 
of $35 per Canadian consumers that would be captured by the buyers. It is unlikely that consumers would 
benefit from the total savings computed, since processors and/or retailers would have little incentives for 
total price transmission.   
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farmer would stand to lose roughly $175,000 in the short run. The net effect would be a 
societal gain of roughly $60 million. On the basis of these results, one could conclude 
that the government should work toward dairy trade liberalization. Such conclusion 
could be premature since the results of the study rely on numerous assumptions and 
are in a partial equilibrium setting. With a  net gain of $60 millions (dairy processors’ 
sales were roughly 15 billion dollars in Canada in 2010), it is likely that the impacts in 
rural  areas  in  terms  of  economic  activities  and  infrastructure  losses,  following  the 
bankruptcy  or  disappearance  of  numerous  dairy  farms,  might  rapidly  outweigh  the 
slight gains computed by the analysis. Moreover, the numerous hypotheses used in the 
modeling exercise may change the real amplitude of the results. Again, this suggests 
that the exercise is more important than the results. 
The use of neoclassical theory and how it relates to the dairy sector 
Neoclassical theory relies on the work of marginalists such as Walras, Jevons and Pareto 
(1830-1930)  who  introduced  sophisticated  mathematics  into  economic  theory.  The 
important  research  by  the  marginalists  was  expanded  upon  by  economists  such  as 
Marshall, Hicks, Solow, Samuelson and others in the 20
th century. This resulted in a set 
of  well  defined  mathematical  models  that  described  the  interconnections  of  an 
economic system. The mathematics used in economics is for the most part inspired by 
the  First  Law  of  Thermodynamics  of  Physics  (the  mathematical  tools  of  equilibrium 
analysis).  However,  the  use  of  such  mathematical  tools  necessitates  important 
assumptions such as perfect rationality. This has been an old debate in economics that 
dates back to an exchange of letters between Walras and the mathematician Poincaré 
in 1901. Poincaré wrote to Walras «You regard men as indefinitely selfish and infinitely 
farsighted. The first hypothesis may perhaps be admitted in a first approximation, the 
second may call for some reservations». Poincarré was pointing out that, although the 
mathematical equations were correct, the assumptions needed to solve them were likely 
to generate conclusions ﾫ… devoid of all interestﾻ.
6  This also explains why the creation 
of wealth is not integrated in economics (the First Law of Thermodynamic states that 
energy  is  neither  created  nor  destroyed).  In  fact,  economics  is  being  defined  in 
traditional textbooks as the science that allocates scare resources in face of unlimited 
needs in the most efficient way. The notion of general equilibrium inherited from the 
                                                      
6 E. Beinhocker (2006), The Origin of Wealth, Harvard Business School Press, p.49.  
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marginalists does not describe a permanent state, but a series of shocks generating 
temporary  equilibrium.  Nevertheless,  the  time  between  shocks  is  sufficient  for 
equilibrium  (even  temporary)  to  be  reached  and  can  thus  be  predicted  in  a  static 
analysis framework. Picture 1 illustrates the neoclassical equilibrium. 
Picture 1: Illustration of a static equilibrium 
 
The Second Law of Thermodynamic, which was discovered after the marginalists era, 
introduces  the  concept  of  entropy  (disorder  or  randomness),  which  explains  why 
perpetual movement cannot exist and, more importantly, focuses on the  concept of 
closed and open systems that can limit the relevance of current economic theory. The 
notion  of  equilibrium  in  economics  and  its  predictability  is  greatly  affected  by  the 
«static» analysis.  
«The  economy  is  too  complex,  too  nonlinear,  too  dynamic,  and  too 
sensitive to the twists and turns of chance to be amenable to prediction 
over anything but the very shortest terms. Even if we were as rational as 
possible and had all the information we could want, the computational 
complexity of the economy is such that the future would happen before 
we would have time to predict it» Beinhocker, (2006) p.323. 
On this basis, it appears that Picture 2 better illustrates the notion of equilibrium, that is 
a dynamic and unstable equilibrium state.  
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Picture 2: Illustration of a constantly changing (dynamic) equilibrium 
 
This  does  not  imply  that  neoclassical  economic  theory  is  not  useful;  it  represents  a 
starting  point  for  understanding  numerous  economic  situations  that  transpire  in  a 
modern  economy.  Neoclassical  theory  should  not  be  seen  as  a  final  destination, 
economic theory keeps evolving and blocks (sometimes independent of current theory) 
such as game theory, experimental and behavioural economics are constantly added. 
Thus, the reality of the dairy sector as well as other agricultural or non agricultural 
sector often does not match neoclassical theoretical prescriptions. Some of the reasons 
for this mismatch are the fixed resources present in the dairy industry and the significant 
lags between the time a decision is made in response to a market signal and the time it 
takes  to  alter  production.  The  perishability  of  the  product  is  another  important 
characteristic of the dairy sector that limits the straightforward applicability of standard 
economic theory. This «problem» explains why some coordination devices are found in 
most  countries’  dairy  value  chains.  This  coordination  takes  numerous  forms  such  as 
vertical integration (numerous steps along the value chain are controlled by a single 
entity), horizontal integration (extremely large dairy farms, one dairy farm that could 
supply a whole region or country) or supply management.
7 
 
                                                      
7 A country example of horizontal integration is Saudi Arabia where one farm (Almarai) in the desert milks more than 
100 000 cows in two sites and cultivates 22 500 hectares under irrigation.  
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The need for coordination: Recent example  
The period 2007-2009 is a good example that illustrates the coordination problems in 
the dairy sector. In 2007 and early 2008, milk prices reached unprecedented levels in 
international  markets,  including  the  U.S.  and  Europe  (see  Table  1).  Dairy  farmers 
reacted to these high prices by increasing production (see Table 2)  
Table 1: Farm milk price in California and France and Skim milk powder price on the 
international market, 2007-2009 
2007 2008 2009
California U.S. France International California U.S. France International California U.S. France International
Average price 17,27 19,16 31,39 4895 16,02 18,40 36,3 3526 10,81 12,82 28,91 2924
Max 20,23 21,81 n.a. 5768 17,44 20,70 n.a. 4156 14,47 16,37 n.a. 3803
Min 12,00 14,66 n.a. 3691 12,41 15,78 n.a. 2657 9,58 11,27 n.a. 2582
 
Note: U.S. and California prices are in US dollars per hundredweight, France prices are in Euros 
per 100 kg and international prices are Western Europe high weekly price for skim milk 
powder 
Sources: California Department of Food and Agriculture, NASS milk production report, 
L'économie laitière en chiffres- Cniel 2010 and AAC Canadian Dairy Information Center; 
University of Wisconsin – Understanding dairy markets 
Table 2: Production level in the U.S., California and France, 2007-2009 
California Variation (t-1) U.S. Variation (t-1) France Variation (t-1)
2007 40 646         185 602      22 312 323      
2008 41 243         1,5% 189 992      2,4% 23 121 743       3,6%
2009 39 512         -4,2% 189 320      -0,4% 22 168 522       -4,1%  
Note: U.S. and California volumes are in million pounds, France quantities are in 1000 litres 
Sources: California Department of Food and Agriculture, NASS milk production report, 
L'économie laitière en chiffres- Cniel 2010 
 
Unfortunately,  at  the  same  time  the  price  of  feed  increased  significantly  while 
consumption of dairy products decreased due to rising prices at the retail level and the 
impact of the global economic crisis. Thus,  in 2009 the dairy sector in the U.S. and 
Europe was in a state of overproduction that led to a major crisis in the industry. The 
crisis necessitated important government budgetary interventions in the U.S. as well as  
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in Europe. The ad hoc subsidy in Europe was € 280 million and an increase in the U.S. 
support price resulted in a estimated supplemental cost of federal dairy programs in 
2009 of $350 million (Pokononews.net November 2009, Grey et al. 2010), for a total federal 
support of roughly $1 billion. Additional costs involved the elimination of over 226,000 
dairy cows through the program Coop Working Together financed by U.S. dairy farmers 
on  a  voluntary  basis  (CWT  website).  To  illustrate  the  importance  of  this  crisis,  the 
International Farm comparison Network (IFCN) has used three methods of comparing 
cost of production for a typical large dairy farm (2,200 cows) in New York State
8. The 
result of this exercise was that with the average U.S. milk price in 2009, the typical farm 
did not cover its variable costs (input costs), independently of the method used.  
In the US, the government appointed Dairy Industry Advisory Committee noted that the 
crisis lasted longer than it should have since in response to low farm prices, U.S. dairy 
farmers were very slow to reduce their production levels (why sacrifice myself for the 
good of the industry if the others do not?) (see Table 2, U.S. volumes). In fact, some 
dairy farmers increased their production (with a negative return) in reaction to low 
price. This counterintuitive (short term) behaviour is explained by the imperative to 
maintain cash flow in order to pay bank loans and remain in business long enough to 
pass the crisis. In this game, one hopes that other dairy farms will go out of business in 
order to reduce supply and bring prices back to more normal levels. This situation is not 
particularly efficient given that it is the lack of market coordination (adequate supply 
response)  that  results  in  a  rationalization  of  the  industry  and  not  the  relative 
competitiveness of players in the industry, like theory would suggest. This problem has 
been identified by U.S. legislators and Congress had been considering implementing 
policies  that  would  address  the  lack  of  adequate  supply  response  due  to  the 
coordination problem ( National  Milk  Producer  Federation,  July  2010).  The  Committee  also 
noted that price volatility has increased significantly over the years as dairy farms are 
increasing in size and further specialized, as illustrated by Figure 1. This is an illustration 
of the prevalence of fixed assets in the dairy sector, which magnifies the coordination 
problem and generates more price volatility.  
                                                      
8 The three methods are full economic cost, family living cost method, cash cost method. For more information 
consult IFCN Dairy Report 2010.  
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Figure 1: Proportional Month to Month Change in the US All-Milk Price Series, 1988-2010 
 
Source: Nicholson and Stephenson (2010) Analysis of proposed programs to mitigate price 
volatility in the U.S. dairy industry 
The lack of coordination issue is illustrated in Table 2 where we observe an important 
discrepancy between US and California production responses in 2009. California dairy 
production dropped by an unprecedented 4.2%, while the decline in the rest of the 
country was less than one percent. The reason why California dairy producers reacted 
more quickly is due to the imposition by California cooperatives and other processors of 
a  production  basecaps,  initiated  in  2008.  (California  Dairy  Statistics,  2009).  The  basecap 
imposed a strict limit (quota) on the quantity of milk that farmers could deliver to 
processors.  The  basecap  meant  that  processors,  who  were  already  operating  at 
capacity, did not want an excess supply of milk to deal with during a period of declining 
consumption. Thus, the basecap was a way to coordinate the value chain that was 
imposed by processors. 
During the same period, the Canadian dairy sector was unaffected by the dairy crisis. 
Both  dairy  prices  and  production  remained  stable.  Importantly,  the  Canadian 
government, unlike their counterparts in the United States and Europe, did not have to 
intervene in the dairy industry during this world dairy crisis. It appears that the supply  
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management system in Canada enabled the industry to avoid some of the difficulties 
that were encountered in other developed countries during the 2008-09 period. Supply 
management is an efficient coordination tool, since it coordinates the national supply 
(through  production  rules  at  the  farm  level)  and  demand.  By  nature,  supply 
management also isolate most of the Canadian dairy sector from international markets, 
which also explains why Canada averted the 2009 dairy crisis.  
Table 3: Average farm price of milk in and milk production in Canada, 2007-2009 
Canada farm milk price Canada dairy production
$/hl  '000 hl
2007 68,63 76 587
2008 69,96 75 800
2009 71,25 76 736  
Sources: AAC Canadian Dairy Information Centre, Statistic Canada, CANSIM, 003-0008 and 003-
0011. 
 
Is Dairy Production Unique? 
Not all aspects of dairy production are unique. Other industries also have large fixed 
assets  and  major  price  cycles.  Most  commodity  based  industries  such  as  in  the 
natural resources sector would meet these criteria. However, natural resources have 
an important advantage in that their products are not perishable and can be left in 
their  natural  form  for  a  considerable  length  of  time  before  being  extracted  or 
harvested. In addition, most natural resources are exploited by large national or 
international  firms  unlike  in  the  dairy  farming  industry.  Natural  resources 
production is usually greatly reduced by those firms when prices are not favourable, 
which  facilitates  coordination,  as  opposed  to  the  highly  disaggregated  and 
perishable nature of production that characterizes the dairy industry. Nevertheless, 
even in the highly competitive crude oil industry, one could argue that coordination 
efforts are taking place as illustrated by OPEC’s effort to control oil production.  One 
could  further  add  that  when  a  CEO  of  a  natural  resource  company  decides  to 
temporarily close a plant or a mine, he will usually not lose is job and home in the 












t a Glance:  
 
In most developed countries, a vast array of market coordination tools are 
used in shaping dairy policies;. 
Canada has significant intervention in its dairy sector with production quota, 
imports restriction and a support price based on cost of production;  
India and China are still at the early stage of the development of their dairy 
industry.  Concerns  for  these  countries  are  focused  more  on  growth, 
specialization and technical gain in productivity. 
The world dairy industry is not a typical industry and Canada’s intervention policies are 
not unique.  The United States and the EU also regulate this sector. At the other end of 
the spectrum, New Zealand opted to completely deregulate its dairy industry as part of 
a sweeping reforms program for the economy undertaken in the 1980s. However, at the 
same  time  the  government  was  heavily  involved  in  the  creation  of  Fonterra,  a  co-
operative that processes most of the country’s milk and is a near- monopoly
9. More 
recently, Australia has also followed the New Zealand approach and has essentially let 
market forces determine outcomes in its dairy sector.  
                                                      
9 In Summer 2011, Fonterra is under government investigation for non competitive raw milk pricing due 










This  section  is  by  no  means  exhaustive;  it  dresses  a  rough  picture  of  the  different 
regulatory  regimes  covering  the  dairy  industry  in  the  c ountries  previously  mentioned. 
Also,  to  gain  a  different  perspective  on  these  issues,  dairy  policies  in  two  emerging 
markets, India and China, are looked at as well.     
Canada 
Following World War II the Canadian dairy sector saw government intervention in the 
form of various floor price policies. At the end of the sixties, as previously mentioned, 
Canada started to lose its privileged access to the UK dairy market due to the future 
entrance of the UK in the European Economic Community (1973). This resulted in farm 
milk surpluses in Canada, low price and costly support from the federal government. In 
response, Canadian dairy policy evolved toward supply management.  
Supply  management  relies  on  provincial  and  federal  laws  and  has  three  major 
components: 
An aggregate production quota that reflects total Canadian demand for butterfat; 
An industrial milk price that reflects farmers’ cost of production
10; 
Import restrictions on dairy products. 
Setting production levels: For fluid milk, the level of production is set at the provincial 
level and is on demand. For industrial milk, the aggregate production level is first set at 
the national level and reflects how much milk Canadian processors will require based on 
Canadian consumers demand at a target price. The target price is based on producers 
cost of production plus a processing margin. Since it would be difficult to monitor the 
large array of dairy products that exists and to put them in milk equivalent, in reality the 
stocks of butter is the indicator of demand. Since butter and skim milk powder are also 
buffer dairy products (produced when there is excess milk), when the stocks of these 
products  increases  over  a  certain  level,  it  indicates  excess  production  relative  to 
                                                      
10 Industrial is the farm milk that is processed into dairy products, while fluid milk is the farm milk 
dedicated to liquid milk and cream.  
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demand, similarly when the stocks are too low it indicates an excess demand relative to 
production.  
The aggregate demand is then allocated to provinces on an historical basis as well as on 
population growth. Provinces then decide how the production quota would be allocated 
among  producers.  Initially,  the  quota  was  allocated  on  an  historical  basis  and 
centralized  auction  markets  were  put  into  place  at  the  provincial  level  for  future 
exchanges. Quota is not traded between provinces. Following a much greater demand 
of quota (often at the margin) than  the supply (often retiring producers) the price of 
quota have reached very high prices , up to $40 000 for the equivalent of a cow annual 
production. This problem has been partially addressed and current prices tend toward 
$25 000. Still, quota value represents roughly half of the value of a dairy farm (roughly 
1.5 million dollars for the average dairy farm in Canada. The quota own by individual 
producers is a market share, therefore if quota is increased by 2%, all producers can 
produce 2% more milk. On the other hand, if quota is cut by 2%, all producers will have 
to reduce their production by 2%.  
Since production level is set on a butterfat basis, and given the mix of dairy products 
consumed by Canadian, a structural surplus of solid non fat (snf) exists. This reflects the 
unbalance between the demand for butterfat and the quantity of snf in farm milk. 
Canadian dairy producers are financially responsible of the warehousing and disposal of 
this structural or any other type of surpluses. 
Setting price level: As previously mentioned, a cost of production is used to fix a target 
price for industrial milk at the farm. In order to achieve that price, the Canadian Dairy 
Commission (CDC) establishes a support price at which it would purchase butter and 
skim milk powder. This support price is used by provincial board to negotiate sales 
convention with processors. Provincial boards are also responsible for milk allocation 
among processors based on predefined and negotiated rules. In a nutshell, farm milk is 
allocated on a class basis, the highest class getting allocation priority. Classes are from 1 
to 5, class 1 being for fluid milk and cream, while class 4 is for butter. Fluid milk (class 1) 
is  priced  slightly  differently.  It  is  priced  following  changes  in  productio n  costs, 
consumers’ disposable income and inflation. Producers receive a pool price (weighted 
average of all classes) that also take into account their milk quality and components.  
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Canada’s  farm  milk  price  is  in  the  high  end  of  prices  received  by  dairy  farmers 
worldwide, and price volatility is at a minimum.  
Restricting imports: In order to maintain a domestic farm milk price higher than the 
international  price  and  to  have  an  effective  production  quota,  imports  must  be 
restricted. Following the 1995 Uruguay Round agreement, Canada’s import restrictions 
on dairy products were converted into tariffs, which are now in the 200% to 290% 
range, while a market access of 5% of domestic consumption was given. Canada dairy 
sector is domestically oriented. Therefore, Canada is a minor exporter of dairy products, 
mostly  its  structural  surplus  (skim  milk  powder)  and  some  high  end  products.  It  is 
important to understand that dairy trade is concentrated on cheese, butter and milk 
powders, products that have import restrictions in most countries. In addition, the EU 
and the US do sell most of their dairy products below their cost of production on the 
international market and need exports subsidies to be competitive. This environment 
creates significant pressure on international trade negotiations since export subsidies 
are a major issue in the current WTO trade negotiations. 
United States 
The  U.S.  government’s  dairy  policy  is  essentially  composed  of  two  regulation 
mechanisms:  Federal  Milk  Marketing  Orders  that  began  in  the  1930s  and  a  price 
support program implemented by the Farm Bill of 1949. The price support program 
enables  the  federal  government  to  purchase  processed  dairy  products  when  the 
domestic market price drops below a pre-determined price. The Federal Milk Marketing 
Orders (FMMO) permits producers to benefit from a price discrimination mechanism 
that is paid for by dairy processors. Processors have to pay a higher price for fluid 
compared with industrial milk. This price discrimination mechanism also includes an 
equalization of prices (pool price) paid to producers. 
The price support program combined with State (California) or Federal Orders result in a 
domestic  price  of  milk  above  international  prices.  Thus,  to  avoid  an  over-supply  of 
foreign  dairy  products  from  flooding  the  domestic  market,  the  federal  government 
established  import  controls.  As  for  Canada,  to  comply  with  the  Uruguay  Round 
Agreement  on  global  trade,  the  quota-based  import  controls  were  phased  out  and 
replaced by tariffs starting in 1995.  
 
27 
In the 1980s’, the price support program had resulted in serious surpluses of milk in the 
domestic market and stocks of cheese, butter and skim milk powder. To address this 
issue, the government implemented a Milk Diversion Program in 1983. In a nutshell, the 
program forced producer to reduce their milk production from a base year and were 
paid  not  to  produce  that  milk.  The  results  of  the  program  were  mixed  as  milk 
production  declined,  but  only  on  a  temporary  basis.  This  led  the  government  to 
introduce the Dairy Termination Program (DTP) in 1985. This program paid participating 
farmers to eliminate their entire herds of dairy cows. Farmers who participated in the 
program weren’t permitted to use their dairy facilities or start another dairy farm for 
five years. The program only managed to reduce the average size of the dairy herd by 2 
per  cent  in  1986,  since  it  did  not  prevent  other  dairy  farmers  to  increase  their 
production. In light of their important costs and their mixed results, these two programs 
are seen as a failure by US dairy stakeholders.  
The 1996 Farm Bill questioned the utility of FMMO and of the support price. In fact, the 
Federal Milk Marketing Orders system was slightly reformed and consolidated, while 
the  price  support  was  maintained.  The  principles  of  price  discrimination  and 
equalization  were  essentially  maintained.  The  2002  Farm  Bill  introduced  direct 
payments for class I based on a reference price and with a limit in terms of the volume 
that can be under the program (Milk Income Loss Contract).  
Another  important  initiative  in  the  U.S.  dairy  industry  is  the  Cooperatives  Working 
Together  (CWT)  Herd  Retirement  Program  that  was  started  in  2003.  This  voluntary 
program perceives a fee per hundredweight of milk from cooperative members (more 
than 80% of milk in the U.S. is marketed through cooperatives). The program attempts 
to  support  milk  prices  in  the  United  States  through  herd  retirements  and  export 
subsidies. When market conditions are judged appropriate, dairy farmers are asked to 
submit bids to retire their entire herd for a minimum period of 12 months. The goal of 
this reverse auction is to retire a maximum of milk production for a given amount of 
money. From October 2008 to October 2009, CWT has retired over 256,000 cows and 
heifers. Given the uneasiness expressed by numerous producers regarding the slaughter 
of  healthy  cows,  the  modest  success  of  the  program  and  the  free  riding  problems 
(producers who do not participate still get the benefit), the program will not further 
retire cows but will concentrate on export subsidies.   
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Following the 2008-2009 dairy crisis, US dairy policy effectiveness was questioned by 
some industry stakeholders. Therefore, the US Secretary of Agriculture, Tom Vilsack, 
created the Federal Dairy Industry Advisory Committee to "… work to find long term 
solutions to assist this struggling industry." (Cornell Chronicle online, January 7 2010). 
Two programs, whose goals are to better control milk price fluctuations and to address 
supply and demand imbalance, have been seriously studied. Those two programs have 
gathered at some point important stakeholders’ support. 
The first one is the Marginal Milk Pricing Program. In summary, each dairy farmer has a 
base level and would pay a penalty equal to the Class III price if he produces milk above 
and beyond his adjusted base level. The program would go into effect when net farm 
price falls below preset levels. Thus, it sends a strong economic signal to dairy farmers 
relative  to  the  negative  marginal  value  of  excess  milk  production.  Penalty  revenue 
generated would be used to purchase cheese and thereby increase demand. The cheese 
would then be donated to charitable food programs. 
The  second  one,  Foundation  for  the  Future  would  eliminate  FMMO  and  the  MILC 
program and the support price to replace them with a Dairy Producer Margin Protection 
Program (DPMPP) and a Dairy Market Stabilization Program (DMSP).The DPMPP is a 
margin insurance program designed to provide a floor for producer margins. It would 
provide  all  producers  a  base  level  of  protection,  along  with  a  voluntary  level  of 
supplemental coverage. The DPMPP will pay an insurance indemnity when catastrophic 
losses occur on their dairy operation, such as in 2009. In parallel, the DMSP would send 
a  strong  signal  to  producers  that  milk  production  needs  to  be  reduced.  When  the 
program would trigger, dairy producers will receive a 30-day notice that they will be 
paid for just 98% of their average milk production in the previous three months. Thus, 
any increase in production would be unpaid.  
European Union 
The six founding countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) have had a 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) since 1962. The CAP has been the major driver of the 
EEC (now the EU) ever since. At the time, a price support higher than world price, 
import control and funds to buy and stock surpluses made the bulk of EEC dairy policy.  
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This eventually led to important structural surpluses whose disposal and warehousing 
costs became prohibitive.  
The problem was addressed with the implementation of production quota, for a 5 year 
period, in 1984. The quota was initially set at the 1981 level plus 1% on a country basis, 
for political reasons. This was still a surplus situation and the following years, quota was 
reduced  by  1%  to  2%  a  few  times,  while  overqu ota  production  faced  important 
penalties. The introduction of production quotas was able to achieve at least some of its 
goals. The stocks of dairy inventories have come down since the early 1980s and are 
currently at levels that are considered to be manageable. 
The 2000 CAP reform led to the important Luxembourg agreement (June 2003). More 
specifically on the dairy sector, the agreement extended dairy quota until 2015. In order 
to smooth the quota elimination, quota volume has been increased at a faster rate than 
consumption (which reduces its effectiveness and its price) and butter price supports 
was reduced by 25% and maximum purchase of butter was cut by more than half over 
four  years.  Moreover,  the  official  target  price  for  milk  was  abolished.  Other  mor e 
general reforms that also affected dairy are: 
  Income  support  measures  are  completely  decoupled.  Direct  subsidies  are 
aggregated in a unique payment, computed on a historical basis and linked to 
the number of hectares in production (thus a producer who before received 
subsidies for corn, milk and hog would receive one direct payment that would 
then be attached to his hectares of corn or whatever he sees fit to produce on 
his land. For example, one could stop producing hogs, milk and corn and instead 
only produce wheat. This change would still generate the same subsidy amount 
for the farmer the first year; 
  Unique payments over 5000 Euros were reduced by 5% a year starting in 2006 
(3% and 4% the two previous years).  
  The unique payment is linked to the respect of best practices, environmental 




In the mid 1980s, the New Zealand government was faced with a budget crisis not 
unlike that currently gripping some EU countries. In response, the government at the 
time initiated a wave of deregulation that included the dairy sector. The New Zealand 
government focused on the dairy industry because it was considered to be a highly 
regulated sectors and because of its importance.  The New Zealand Milk Board, at the 
time,  regulated  every  phase  of  dairy  production  and  consumption  including  home 
delivery,  production  quotas,  and  the  establishment  of  exclusive  market  zones  for 
processing plants that eliminated competition. The price of milk was set at every level 
of the supply chain from the farm to the retail store and, even home delivery routes, 
were specified. Consumers were only permitted to obtain milk via home delivery or at 
special dairy convenience stores.  
As a result of deregulation, there are fewer dairy farms in New Zealand and the average 
farm size increased. In 1985, there were roughly 16,000 dairy herds in the country 
compared with less than 12,000 in 2009. At the same time, the average milking cow per 
farm has gone up from less than 150 to 375 by 2009... Although by 1993 the New 
Zealand dairy sector was mostly deregulated, the Dairy Board was still in place and was 
by then the world's largest dedicated dairy marketing network. In 1996 the Dairy Board 
Amendment Act transferred ownership of the Dairy Board's assets to the country's 12 
co-operatives.  Subsequent  merger  discussions,  legislative  changes  and  government 
involvement  culminated  in  the  formation  of  Fonterra  Cooperative  Group  in  2001. 
Fonterra  is New  Zealand  almost  unique  buyer of  farm  milk  (more than  95%  of  the 
country’s milk) and act has an almost unique seller of dairy products. Fonterra sells 
dairy products in more than 140 countries and is the world's leading exporter of dairy 
products. It is responsible for more than a third of international dairy trade. 
In fact, more than 90 per cent of New Zealand’s milk is exported. New Zealand milk 
production system differs from most other developed countries. It is a seasonal pasture 
base production, implying that buildings are minimal and almost no milk is produced 
during  the  winter  months  of  June  and  July,  with  the  exception  of  fluid  milk.  To 
compensate for the cost of producing milk year round, fluid milk producers receive an 
important  premium.  Thus,  costs  of  production  are  very  low,  which  allows  New 
Zealanders  to  be  price  takers  on  the  international  market.  Since  almost  all  dairy  
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producers in New Zealand are members of Fonterra, New Zealand dairy structure offers 
similitude with vertical integration. New Zealand dairy farmers have two sources of 
revenues from their milk, the price paid by Fonterra and the dividend paid by the 
cooperative  (Fonterra)  to  its  member.  The  cooperative  also  use  delivery  rights  to 
coordinate supply.  This right has to be purchased if a producer wants to increase 
production. This amounts, to some extent, to a production quota.  
Australia 
Dairy policy in Australia can be defined in two distinct periods: the period with support 
(before the mid 1980s) and the policy reform period (starting in the mid 1980s). Before 
the reform, fluid milk, which represented roughly 20% of all farm milk, was regulated by 
quota and carried a premium over industrial milk. The industrial milk was characterized 
by  domestic  price  supports,  import  controls,  export  subsidies  and  restriction  of the 
marketing of substitute products. Price of industrial milk was based on the pooling of 
market returns for butter, cheddar type cheeses, casein; and two types of milk powder. 
For each of those products, a levy was imposed on domestic sales which raised the price 
paid by consumers. Levy funds were combined with export returns and manufacturers 
received an average pooled return based on the amount they produced. Thus, exports 
were  subsidized by  a  tax  on  domestic  consumers.  Since  all  participants  in  the  pool 
received the same average return, there was little incentive for market development 
(Harris et al. 2008).  
From the mid eighties to 2000, numerous reforms took place in Australia dairy policies, 
each  aiming  at  increasing  the  global  competitiveness  of  the  industry  and  gradually 
reduce the level of support. First the pooling of export returns was eliminated. Instead 
processors  would  receive  the  world  price  for  their  exports  and  a  uniform  payment 
under the Market Support Payment program (MSP). The MSP was funded by a farm 
gate levy on all milk production. Moreover, price support was also reduced. 
Later in the nineties, the Domestic Market Support Scheme (DMS) was introduced. The 
new marketing arrangements did not link the level of support to exports and had levies 
on domestic sales of milk, as well as on manufactured dairy products. The combined 
levy revenue was used to fund a DMS payment to manufacturing milk producers, based 
on their output of manufacturing milk.  Following these change, three States abolished  
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fluid milk quotas and replaced them with pooling arrangements. Farmers in these states 
received a fluid milk price premium for a fixed proportion of their total output. Other 
States maintained their fluid milk quotas until July 2000 (Harris et al. 2008). 
In the late 1990s, strong growth in manufacturing milk supplies and import competition 
had diluted the farm gate value of the market support payments. Import protection had 
been reduced since the mid-eighties and New Zealand exporters were supplying more 
than 10% of the cheese market. Therefore the industry accepted full deregulation with 
adjustment assistance to manage the impact on the farm sector.  
Thus, the federal government put together a restructuring package that provided Aus. 
$1.8 billion for the industry. The package had three main components: 
  A Dairy Structural Adjustment Program (DSAP) of transitional assistance for all 
dairy farmers. 
  A voluntary Dairy Exit Program (DEP) to assist farmers in financial distress, was 
provided  as  an  alternative  to  the  DSAP  for  producers  who  wanted  to  exit 
production; 
  Dairy  regional  Adjustment  Program  to  help  communities  who  might  suffer 
because of the importance of dairy in their community. 
These programs were partially funded by a levy imposed on domestic sales of liquid 
milk which lasted several years following the reforms. Since States where fluid milk was 
more important were the most affected, by the end of the years 2000, the government 
created the Supplementary Dairy Adjustment program targeted at dairy producers in 
regions most affected by deregulation. More than $A122 million were given to 7750 
dairy producers.  
Australia dairy  sector has  suffered  important  droughts  in  2006-2008, which  distorts 
statistics, but exports between 2000 and 2007 have dropped by 10%, the number of 
dairy farms has dropped from 13,000 in 2000 to 8000 in 2007, while the average herd 




Before  the  1990s,  India’s  government  heavily  protected  dairy  farmers  from  import 
competition  by  grouping  them  together  in  cooperatives.  The  policies  included  both 
domestic price support and high tariff protection. The dairy sector in India has always 
attracted the attention of government authorities that have viewed this sector as a 
means of increasing employment opportunities in rural parts of the country. 
In  the  early  1990s,  economic  reforms  started  to  take  hold  in  India  as  government 
leaders realized that their country was falling behind some of the booming economies 
in the Asia Pacific region, notably China. The reform agenda also included the dairy 
industry. The industry was de-licensed, which meant that new entrance into the milk 
processing sector is now possible. The control of all dairy imports into India by the 
Indian  Dairy  Corporation  was  also  relaxed  and  multinational  corporations  with  milk 
processing plants were allowed into the dairy industry. The goal of these reforms was to 
encourage greater competition in the industry and lower prices paid by consumers. 
However,  in  1992  worries  about  excessive  milk  capacity  and  growing  sales  of 
contaminated milk led to the introduction of limited controls under the auspices of the 
Milk and Milk Products Order. 
In 1994, India became a member of the WTO and this development resulted in even 
more changes in the dairy industry. As part of India’s commitment to the WTO, all non-
tariff barriers on imports of dairy products were eliminated. Following the removal of 
quantitative restrictions on dairy products, imports and exports of dairy products were 
permitted  under  a  lower  tariff  regime  as  long  as  dairy  products  complied  with 
inspection  requirements.  As  a  result  of  these  changes,  imports  of  milk,  butter  and 
butter oil increased significantly in the late 1990s. Currently, India’s tariffs on major 
dairy  products  such  as  milk  powders  and  butter  are  very  modest  by  international 
standards. 
The reforms have been successful in increasing the overall competitiveness of India’s 
dairy industry although some problems remain. India’s dairy sector would benefit from 
the removal of protection in developed countries like Canada, the United States and EU 
members. The industry would also strengthen if more reforms were implemented to 
increase the productivity and efficiency of milk production and processing. Smaller dairy  
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farms in India should be linked to the domestic dairy market through cooperatives and 
contract  farming  in  order  to  benefit  from  rising  export  demand  for  India’s  dairy 
products. 
China 
China’s dairy production was only around 1 million tonnes per year in 1980, however, 
during the following 15 years, output started to increase at an average annual rate of 
close to 15 per cent. By the mid 1990s, China became the 20
th overall milk producer in 
the world. Between 1997 and 2003, the pace of growth in the industry was even higher 
(20 per cent per year) and China is currently one of the top ten dairy producers in the 
world. One of the main factors behind the increase in production was the expansion of 
the dairy herd. In 1980, there were only around 640,000 dairy cows in China – a number 
that grew to 4.9 million by 2000. By 2004, there were close to 9 million dairy cows in 
China.   
At the same time as the herd size was increasing, milk output per cow also expanded 
mainly because of better technology. Dairy technology has improved significantly since 
the government implemented its reform agenda in the late 1970s. Before 1980, there 
were  few  genetically  improved  dairy  cows  in  the  country  and  most  of  them  were 
managed  by  state  farms  and  collectives  that  used  inefficient,  labour  intensive 
production methods. Also, feed mixes didn’t include any vitamins or other supplements. 
After reforms took hold, improved genetic materials, feeding regimes and milk handling 
equipment have become available to dairy farmers in part because of development aid 
efforts  undertaken  by  the  EU,  Canada  and  the  World  Bank.  Also,  the  government 
lowered restrictions on the importing of dairy technology. In 2001, imports of breeding 
bulls increased to 14,000 from 3,200 in the mid to late 1990s while bull semen imports 
also  rose  sharply.  This  dramatic  increase  in  imports  of  dairy  technology  has,  not 
surprisingly, improved productivity in the dairy sector. 
In addition to improving domestic production of dairy products, China has also opened 
up the sector to global markets. Prior to joining the WTO in the early 2000s, the average 
tariff on dairy products was more than 50 per cent. By 2004, the average tariff plunged 
to 11 per cent and there are currently no tariff rate quotas. In response to lower tariffs, 
trade has increased for traditional dairy products including milk powder. Imports of  
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cheese and other higher value-added dairy products have expanded mainly because 
there is not much domestic production of these products in China.      
It will be crucial for China’s dairy industry to continue to increase production at a rapid 
clip because milk consumption is increasing. Rising incomes and a greater numbers of 
urban dwellers becoming more aware of the health benefits of dairy products are the 
main factors behind this increase in demand for dairy products. If the domestic industry 
hopes  to  succeed  at  keeping up  with demand,  it  must  continue  to  implement new 
technologies and improve efficiency. Expanding cow herds and increasing productivity 
will require huge increases in grain and protein feed consumption. Also, institutions 
within both the dairy industry and government need to better coordinate the expansion 
of  milk  production  and  processing.  The  dairy  industry  has  managed  to  increase 
production despite ongoing inefficiencies in the industry. Changes in agricultural lending 
and capital markets as well as improved market information channels will be required 
to lift dairy production in the years ahead.     
Dairy processors will face increasing competition from abroad as multinational firms 
have already entered dairy markets in China in line with lower barriers to trade in this 
sector.  Also,  the  easing  of  foreign  direct  investment  restrictions,  a  result  of  WTO 
membership, will lead to greater completion from foreign companies. 
Conclusion on dairy policies 
The various dairy policies presented indicate the use of a vast array of coordination 
tools.  By  its  nature,  Canada’s  supply  management  is  oriented  toward  the  domestic 
market. Therefore, Canada does not export much and is a marginal player on the dairy 
international market. Nevertheless, supply is matched with demand and price volatility 
is kept to a minimum.  
US  intervention  in  its  dairy  sector  has  historically  generated  numerous  periods  of 
overproduction  and  important  cost  for  governments.  Over  the  years  the  various 
programs  that  were  set  up  to  reduce  supply  were  not  effective.  Moreover,  price 
volatility became a major issue, as well as the lack of supply response to very low price. 
The US has acknowledged the price volatility issue of milk at the farm, as well as the 
lack  of  supply  response  to  low  prices  (coordination).  The  US  dairy  sector  is  mostly 
oriented towards its domestic market, but exports are nevertheless significant.  
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Dairy policy in the European Union (EU) between 1960 and the mid-eighties was similar 
to US dairy policy with price support, purchase of surpluses, import restriction and 
export subsidies. However, given the more generous price support of the EU, problems 
of overproduction and of stocks of butter, cheese and powder were more acute than in 
the US. This created a major budgetary problem that eventually led to a change of dairy 
policy with the implementation of a supply management system similar to Canada’s. It 
is interesting to note that EU dairy policy seems now to move toward deregulation, but 
not to the level of New Zealand or Australia. The total level of intervention, although 
decoupled, is likely to remain important. It will be interesting to see how dairy policy in 
the EU will evolve pass the end of production quota in 2015. In terms of coordination of 
the dairy value chain, it seems that the EU is taking a step backward. 
The New Zealand and the Australian dairy sectors benefit from a production structure 
that makes them among the lowest cost of production region in the world. The two 
countries are also major players on the international market. In fact, their domestic 
consumption is much less important than their exports. The two countries also have in 
common  the  fact  that  their  dairy  sector  is  deregulated  and  receive  little  support. 
However, New Zealand has an almost unique buyer of farm milk and an almost unique 
seller of dairy products on international markets. Moreover, this (almost) unique buyer 
and seller is a cooperative (Fonterra) owned by most of New Zealand dairy farmers. This 
is a major source of coordination of the value chain. It amounts to vertical as well as 
horizontal integration. On the other hand, Australia does not have a «Fonterra» and this 
might explain why the Australian dairy sector has struggled since total deregulation in 
2000, as opposed to New Zealand dairy farmers.   
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As for India and China, the two giants are still at the early stage of the development of 
their dairy industry. Concerns for these countries are more on growth, specialization 
and technical gain in productivity. The need for coordination is minimal in their current 
phase of development given the important growth in demand and the low level of 
sophistication of processing. However, this is likely to change in the next few decades as 
the dairy value chain of these countries will become more mature. 
Sources: swissmilk.ch and La Terre de chez nous, November 18, 2010. 
 
 
The case of Switzerland 
Switzerland has eliminated its dairy quota in May 2009 and created a program to 
compensate expected lower price for farm milk. The result has been a 22% price 
reduction and increase in production with little demand response. Stocks of butter 
and powder have increased and it appears that the market was unable to reach a 
balance between supply and demand. Therefore, the Swiss government supported 
a new intervention to give each producer a reference volume. Production beyond 
this reference will be subject to a special levy. This is a legislative attempt at better 





The Canadian Dairy Sector Faces Pressures 
 
 
t a Glance: 
 
The  competitiveness  of  the  dairy  value  chain  could  suffer  if  farmers  have 
difficulty in obtaining additional quota 
Misaligned incentives contribute to Canada’s large surplus of solid non-fat. 
The  allocation  of  milk  to  provinces  is  currently  a  constraint  for  the  three 
national processors and forces them to make sub-optimal investments to get 
access to milk. This also affects dairy farmers’ revenues. 
Given current Doha trade talks that could potentially lead to tariff reductions 
and greater market access, Canadian dairy farmers need to differentiate their 
products, and agree to limited price increases.  
 
It has been previously mentioned that dairy supply management has contributed to Canadian 
dairy farmers avoiding the dairy crisis that other countries faced in 2008-2009. Canadian dairy 
farmers have also benefitted from higher prices than most of their counterparts in other 
countries, as well as from lower price volatility. Moreover, the direct costs to governments in 
Canada are minimal by contrast with the costs of dairy support programs in the United States 
and Europe. Although these are benefits from supply management for farmers themselves, this 
system also faces important challenges. In this section, important internal and external 











Farmers’ access to quota 
Dairy production quotas at the national level match Canadian consumption. Quota has 
been  initially  allocated  to  provinces  on  a  historical  basis,  while  currently  growth  is 
allocated based on both population (90 per cent) and historical shares (10 per cent). 
Provinces  then  allocate  the  quota  to their  existing  producers  in  proportion  of their 
quota holdings and they also set some volume aside for new entrants into the industry. 
The dairy sector in Canada is mature with limited growth at the aggregate level. As a 
result, milk quota grew by less than 1 per cent a year for the period 2001-2010. Thus, 
most increases in production at the farm level must be bought from the market share 
(quota) of other dairy farmers.  
The  regular  exit  of  dairy  farmers  has,  in  the  past,  permitted  for  such  growth,  as 
indicated by Figure 3. However, it also shows that the rate of exit from the industry has 
slowed down in the last few years. For instance, between 2001 and 2008, 4 per cent of 
producers were leaving production on an annual basis but this percentage has dropped 
to 2 per cent over the last few years. As a result, upward pressure on quota prices has 
transpired. In fact, quota prices have reached up to $40,000 per kg of butterfat in some 
provinces. High quota prices have been perceived as a serious problem since a large 
share of dairy investments has been captured by the quota (quota represents up to 60 
per cent of the value of a dairy farm) and vast sums of money have been transferred 
from  active  farmers  to  exiting  farmers.  This  problem  has  been  partially  addressed 
through the use of a price cap of $25,000 in numerous provinces. However, once the 
cap is reached (which is the case most of the time) quota is allocated administratively 
by giving small quantities of quota to farmers whose prices were equal to or over the 
cap. The result is that successful buyers have received very limited quantities of quota. 
This makes significant increases in production extremely difficult and likely restrains 
producers  from  moving  along  their  cost  curve  or  towards  a  more  cost  efficient 
technology  that  could  improve  economies  of  scale,  potentially  affecting  the 
competitiveness of the dairy value chain.  
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Source: Canadian Dairy Commission and calculations done by AAFC-AID, Dairy Section. 
 
Dairy ingredients and SNF structural surplus
11 
Technological  developments  in  dairy  processing  allow  for  dairy  ingredients  to  be 
substituted to milk in order to increase yield. For example, it takes about 10 units of 
milk to produce 1 unit of cheese. However, if protein enriched milk powder is used, this 
ratio can be reduced (for example to 8 to 1). These dairy ingredients are, for the most 
part, not produced in Canada and were – prior to the mid-2000s - imported free of 
tariffs at low prices. This contributed to the increased of Canada’s surplus of solid non-
fat  (SNF).  Then,  in  the  mid  2000s,  dairy  farmers  successfully  lobbied  the  Federal 
government to apply article 28 of the GATT agreement, which permits restricting such 
imports free of tariffs to the level that existed at the time of the application of the 
article, plus an additional margin. The main issue now is how to transform the roughly 
60 million kg of SNF (issued from the structural surplus and ingredients imports) from a 
dead weight cost to a return for the industry. To address this issue, special classes of 
milk with prices that reflect the international market are already in place. However, 
much more needs to be done, especially to service the growing specialized non-dairy 
                                                      
11 Milk composition is water, butterfat and solid non fat (SNF). SNF is mostly made of proteins, lactose 
and minerals and is used as input in dairy products.  
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food market and to respond to the growing demand from the non-food market such as 
the pharmaceutical industry.  
Fundamentally, incentives will need to change in order to resolve this issue. Currently, 
processors have a guaranteed margin for butter and skim milk powder which makes 
them reluctant to process different «residual» products (than butter and skim milk 
powder), such as dairy ingredients, for which margins are not guaranteed. Moreover, if 
a processor was to use Canadian dairy ingredients for cheese production instead of 
imports, he would have to pay, according to current rule, the class 3a price (the class 3a 
price  is  much  higher  than  imports  or  special  classes).  This  eliminates  much  of  the 
incentive to use Canadian dairy ingredients and, as a result, does not help to reduce the 
structural surplus of SNF which is still not competitive relative to imported  protein 
enriched milk powder.   
National pooling, board and quota exchanges 
Historically,  each  province  had  its  own  pooling
12,  meaning  that  provinces  were 
negotiating the price of milk with local processors based on a target price and according 
to the allocation of milk per classes. This is not surprising since, at the beginning of 
supply management, dairy producers were  numerous and processors were local or 
provincial. However, starting in the 1990s, dairy processors started to concentrate and 
became national  and  eventually  multinational processors.  Today, three  processors 
(Saputo,  Parmalat  and Agropur)  of  similar  size  (o n the  Canadian  market)  process 
roughly 80 per cent of Canadian milk. Thus, in response to potential pricing arbitrage 
between provinces by national processors, the need to rationalize operations (due to 
fewer dairy producers) and to better allocate resources, larger pools have appeared. For 
instance, the P5 pool regroups the Maritime provinces, Quebec and Ontario together. 
This agreement pools dairy farmer returns from all involved milk markets. The Western 
Milk  Pool  includes  the  provinces  of  British  Columb ia,  Alberta,  Saskatchewan  and 
Manitoba in much the same way as the P5 does. Finally, the P10, or Special Class 
                                                      
12 Farm milk is sold to processors based on the utilization for various usages of the milk in a final product. 
Each utilization, refers to a class of milk and associated to each class of milk is a specific price. The 
weighted average of the prices is the pool price that dairy farmers will receive, adjusted for the milk 
components of each dairy farms.   
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Pooling agreement, provides for the pooling of market returns from the special classes 
and animal feed class (4m) and is shared by all dairy farmers across the country. 
Today,  milk  is  allocated  on  a  provincial  basis  but  processors  supply  markets  on  a 
national  basis.  Thus,  the  need  for  a  national  board  and  a  national  pool  system  is 
apparent. A national board would allow for a Canadian allocation and transportation 
policy and reduce costs of raw milk quality programs, as well as of financing and other 
administrative  costs.  More  importantly,  it  would  allow  the  allocation  of  milk  on  a 
national basis (within the limits of transportation costs) and likely increase producer 
revenues.  As  an  illustration,  some  provinces  currently  would  not  have  much  milk 
available  for  a  cheese  processor  who  would  want  to  increase  its  production  in  its 
current processing plants. In those provinces, almost all the milk once used to produce 
butter and skim milk powder (low end products) is diverted to higher end products such 
as  yogurt  and  cheese.  On  the  other  end,  some  other  provinces  are  still  running 
relatively small butter-powder plants. It might be more efficient to have only one or two 
large butter-powder plants in Canada and to divert the milk used in smaller regional 
plants to yogurt and cheese production elsewhere. This would increase the pool price 
for all dairy producers and allow for a better use of resources by processors. In other 
words, the provincial allocation of milk by provinces or by larger pools is currently a 
constraint  for  the  three  national  processors  and  forces  them  to  make  sub -optimal 
investments to get access to milk. At the same time, sub-optimal allocations reduce 
dairy farmers’ pool revenues. 
Another important point in favour of a national decision-making body is the possibility 
that  import  tariffs  on  dairy  products  could  be  eventually  reduced  significantly.  The 
current structure is ill prepared to react to this possibility. A national board to allocate 
milk by province would allow for a uniform, quicker and more efficient reaction to 
changing market conditions.  
This implies that some smaller plants are likely to close and that some provinces might 
lose processing facilities to other provinces. The political sensitivity of this issue seems 
currently detrimental to the dairy value chain. Of even greater sensitivity would be the 
establishment  of  a  national  centralised  auction  for  a  significant  proportion  of  dairy 
production  quota.  The  idea  behind provincial  quota  exchanges  was  to  get  the  best 
allocation of dairy production within a province. The assumption was that farmers who  
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value the most dairy production would bid higher prices and obtain more quota. The 
same logic could certainly apply within Canada. However, the current cap system would 
not  allow  for  such  an  allocation  of  quota  since  once  the  cap  is  reached,  quota  is 
allocated based on administrative, instead of market rules. A centralized national quota 
exchange with demand revealing mechanisms should therefore be considered. 
External pressures 
Doha trade talks 
The most important external pressure that dairy supply management faces in Canada is 
the WTO trade talks (Doha Round). Current discussions involve various scenarios of 
greater market access and significant tariff reduction for super tariffs (such as those 
currently  limiting  imports  on  the  Canadian  dairy  market).  To  preserve  supply 
management, Canada would have to negotiate to have supply managed  production 
covered  under the  sensitive  products provision
13  discussed in the Doha round. This 
could greatly reduce the pressure to lower tariffs, but would be in exchange of greater 
market access. However, the number of sensitive products that a country can designate 
is a major issue. At best, Canada would still need to increase access to its dairy market, 
which would reduce the domestic market share of Canadian farmers.  
If the sensitive products provision is not applied or does not cover all dairy products , 
then  foreign  products  would  have  even  greater  access  to  the  Canadian  market, 
especially if the Canadian dollars continues to trade at or above par with the greenback 
and if international prices are low. In such case, if dairy farmers choose to maintain t he 
same production level, pressure to reduce farm prices will be important and significant 
drops in quota prices would likely follow. On the other hand, if dairy farmers choose to 
maintain current price, quota would need to be reduced, which would accentua te the 
pressure on quota access. One should note that even with current tariff levels, the level 
of protection is often minimal given the appreciation of the Canadian dollar in the past 
few years, which has reduced the cost of imports.  
Canadian  dairy  farm ers  have  no  impact  on  international  dairy  prices  and  foreign 
exchange rates. As a result, their actions to mitigate the potential impact of tariff 
                                                      
13 A sensitive product would be subject to lower import tariff cuts than other products.  
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reductions  and  greater  market  access  would  need  to  concentrate  on  product 
differentiation (e.g., the “100% Canadian Milk” brand program
14), reduction of quota 
value (price cap) and limited price increases on regular farm milk classes, so that the 
gap between domestic and international prices does not widen further.  
While Canadian dairy farmers have already started to work on product differentiation 
through the 100% Canadian Milk program, their greatest efforts to mitigate potential 
negative effects of the Doha Round  has been through lobbying both provincial and 
federal governments together with poultry and egg farmer (SM5) . This SM5 also has a 
strong presence in Geneva and has been very successful on the national scene. In fact, 
largely due to the efforts of the provincial counterparts notably in Ontario, Quebec and 
the  Atlantic  provinces,  the  federal  government  official  position  in  trade  talks  is  to 
defend supply management. Nevertheless, if a global trade deal is made in Geneva to 
conclude the Doha round and supply management has to be modified to accommodate 
the new rules, there will be enormous pressure on Canada to sign a Doha deal that is 
negative for dairy and supply management. The reason is that Canada has a strong 
stake  in  better  access  to  international  markets.  It  also  must  be  remembered  that 
agriculture accounts for less than 2 per cent (4 per cent with the processing sector) of 
the  Canadian  economy  in  terms  of  GDP.  Within  the  Canadian  agriculture  industry, 
numerous important sectors such as cash crop, beef and hog rely heavily on exports. As 
such, it is hard to imagine that Ottawa would put Canada’s global economic interests at 
risk to favour dairy farmers. 
This chapter has looked at a number of issues that supply management is likely to face 
in the future These issues will form the basis for the suggestions that are discussed in 
the  last  chapter  of  the  report.  However,  before  looking  at  the  suggestions,  it  is 
important to look at some of the commonly held views about supply management. This 
will then leave us in a better position to make suggestions for supply management 
going forward.         
 
.
                                                      
14
 The DFC-owned logo identifies, on a voluntary basis, dairy products made from 100% Canadian Milk. Some processors have 





Issues Raised About Supply Management: 
Myth or Reality? 
 
 
t a Glance: 
 
Milk consumption is declining in Canada and most other developed economies, 
so this is not necessarily a result of the supply management system;  
Canadian retail prices for dairy products , in February 2011, were higher than in 
the United States; 
In theory, the incentive to reduce costs at the farm level should be equivalent 
between a supply managed dairy sector and a non-supply managed system but 
evidence  suggests  that  that  supply  management  creates  less  incentive  for 
farmers to reduce costs compared with a non-supply managed system; 
Canadian dairy processors may have difficulties reaching their full potential 
scale because of the regional structure of supply management; 
Canadian farmers can take advantage of existing opportunities in the U.S. fine 
cheese  market  and  should  engage  with  stakeholders  to  identify  and target 
potential value added dairy markets. 
The  previous  chapter  described  some  internal  and  external  pressures  the  system 
currently faces. To further support our suggestions, we focus in this chapter on five 
points  of  view  often  presented  to  oppose  supply  management.  We  examine  the 
evidence supporting or refuting each point of view, and try to put it into context. This 
analysis will then set the stage for some strategic suggestions likely to improve the 










Because of supply management, consumption of dairy products is declining in Canada. 
Facts:  
It  is  a fact that  fluid  milk  consumption  is  declining  in  Canada.  However,  this  is  not 
unique to Canada and could be associated with a change in the mix of dairy products 
consumed by the public, which is influenced by income, demographics, culture and 
other factors. Figure 4 shows the trend in fluid milk consumption in the United States 
and Canada 
Figure 5 shows that in Canada, consumption of yogurt and cheese has been increasing 
in  the  last  ten  years  while  ice  cream  consumption  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  butter 
consumption has been decreasing. A comparison with the United States shows that for 
the  2004-2008  period, per  capita  cheese  consumption  increased by  4.8  per  cent  in 
Canada compared with 3.5 per cent in the United States. For the same period, per 
capita yogurt consumption has increased by 22 per cent in Canada versus 28 per cent in 
the US; per capita ice cream consumption decreased by 24 per cent in Canada while it 
declined by 2 per cent in the US. Finally, per capita consumption of cream increased by 
over 5 per cent in Canada and 1.5 per cent in the United States during the 2004-2008 
period. Thus, overall per capita consumption of dairy products has followed the same 
trend in Canada and the United States, but with different degrees – sometimes to the 
advantage of Canada, sometimes to the United States. In light of this data, it seems 
difficult to draw a firm conclusion or to establish a link between per capita consumption 
of dairy products and the presence of supply management.   
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Figure 4: Per capita consumption of all fluid milk (litre) in Canada  














Sources: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, 003-0012 and USDA NASS Per capita consumption of major 
foods. 
 
Figure 5: Per capita consumption of cheese, butter, SMP,  
yogurt and ice cream in Canada, 1988-2009  
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Source: Statistics Canada, Tables 002-0010, 051-0005 Calculations done by AAFC-AID, Dairy 
Section.  
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Issue 2:  
Retail dairy product prices are more expensive in Canada 
Facts:  
Dairy farmer organizations have argued that dairy products in Canada are not more 
expensive than in the United States. “ According to a survey conducted on 19 occasions 
by Dairy Farmers of Canada since May 1997 in Burlington Vermont and in Longueuil 
Québec, dairy products are 14,4% less expensive in Canada than in the United States” 
(GO5,http://www.go5quebec.ca/fr/gestion.php).  Although  a  comparison  between  the  cities  of 
Longueuil and Burlington is limited in scope, more importantly the depreciation of the 
Canadian dollar vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar played an important part in these comparisons. 
Between  1997  and  2007,  it  was  to  the  advantage  of  Canadian  dairy  products.  The 
exchange rate adjusted comparison remains valid given that, if trade of dairy products 
between Canada and the United States was taking place, Canadian consumers would 
face U.S. prices but would pay in Canadian dollars.  Dairy farmer organizations have also 
used price trends to make their point. 
“Paradoxically, Canada’s more favourable and stable farm gate prices 
do not mean unfavourable price trends for Canadian consumers. On 
the  contrary,  the  oft-repeated  argument  that  supply  management 
means price increases and higher costs for consumers does not stand 
up to analysis. It is in the three countries with supply management - 
Canada,  France  and  the  Netherlands  -  where  consumer  prices 
increased the least during the period under review, to the benefit of 
their dairy consumers” Gouin 2004 in DFC website. 
Although this observation is correct, it does not indicate whether or not dairy retail 
prices in Canada are higher or lower compared with the United States.  
To look at this issue, a spot survey was realized in supermarkets across Canada and the 
United States. This does not represent an exhaustive statistical analysis and a similar 
spot  survey  at  another  point  in  time  might  yield  different  results.  Nevertheless,  it 
indicates that dairy products are, at least sometimes, cheaper in the US than in Canada, 
as  indicated  by  Table  4.  More  specifically,  Table  4  presents  retail  store  prices  for 
national dairy brands in Canada and the United States, in their respective currency.  
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Most prices were accessed through the Internet and discounts or sales were not taken 
into  account.  Prices  were  effective  on  February  25,  2011.  Prices  are  in  US  $  for 
American cities and in Canadian $ for Canadian cities.
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Table 4: A comparison of selected dairy product prices in some Canadian and 
American cities, February 2011 
USA ($US)
Montreal Toronto Victoria Calgary New York 
upstate
San Francisco Atlanta
2% milk (base 4 l) 5.81 5.59 5.19 4.49 3.16 4.64 3.54
Cheddar (base 300 g)  6.99 7.89 7.44 6.39 4.76 4.76 5.29
Butter (454 g)  5.69 5.99 5.99 6.69 3.99 5.49 4.59
Yogurt Yoplait             
(base 4x100g)
2.49 3.12 3.49 3.12 1.41 2.12 1.76
Canada ($Can)
 
Sources: Montréal: http://www.iga.net/; Atlanta: http://www.publix.com/; San Francisco: 
http://www.safeway.com; New York: http://www.wegmans.com/; Toronto: 
Foodatitsbest@metro.ca, Victoria: www.thriftyfoodsonline.com; Calgary: visit of a Safeway 
 
Table 4 indicates that retail prices for the dairy products selected are higher in our 
group of Canadian cities than in our selected U.S. cities for all dairy products, at the 
time of the survey.  This price differential seems to draw little attention from Canadian 
consumers.  One  reason  can  be  linked  to  the  fact  that  dairy  products’  relative 
importance in the basket of consumer goods is small.   According to Mussell (2010), 
food expenditures represent roughly 10 per cent of household income. Also, according 
to the 2001 food expenditure survey, dairy products represent less than 15 per cent of 
food  expenditures  spent  in  store.  Thus,  dairy  comprises  less  than  1.5  per  cent  of 
household  disposable  income.  This  means  that  if  dairy  products  prices  were,  for 
example, 30 per cent more expensive in Canada than in the United States, this would 
represent  an  impact  of  less  than  0.5  per  cent  on  an  average  consumer  budget.  In 
addition, as pointed out by Mussell (2010), one can argue that this differential cannot 
be completely attributed to supply management, which further diminishes the incentive 
by consumer groups to lobby against supply management. Price differential between 
countries can also be affected by differences in processing and distribution structure, as 
                                                      
15 For indicative purpose, in February 25, 2011 the exchange rate for cash transactions, which reflects the 
exchange rate applied on business and consumer transactions, was if you buy us$1 = can $1.003  
(http://www.desjardins.com/fr/taux/change/tableau_billets.jsp)  
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well as by the direct and indirect subsidies to dairy production that exists in the US. 
While dairy purchases comprise a relatively small portion of total consumption in the 
average Canadian household, this does not exclude the possibility that higher prices 
would generate greater effects on low income households that spend proportionally 
more on food than wealthier Canadians.  
 
Issue 3  
Supply management generate little incentive to reduce costs at the farm 
Facts:  
In theory, without supply management, individual dairy farmers set the level of output 
that  maximizes  profits.  To  maximize  profits,  it is  necessary  to  minimize  costs.  With 
supply management, dairy farmers minimize their  costs under a level of production 
constraint. If the level of output constrained by supply management is the same as the 
level of output that maximizes profits, than the two solutions are equivalent (duality). 
The duality argument implies that dairy farmers can easily make adjustments to their 
output level. This means that the incentive to reduce costs would be the same with or 
without supply management. One can therefore argue that high acquisition costs of 
production quota, and more recently the difficulty to access quota due to the price cap 
policy, negatively affects the capability to adjust (increase) output levels in order to 
reduce costs. 
Milk Prices in New Zealand 
It is interesting to note that in the Spring 2011, in New Zealand the price of milk 
has created public outraged due to huge price differential for essentially the same 
milk, which is all coming from Fonterra. Retail prices are going from nz$2.89 to 
nz$5.25  for  a  2-litre  of  the  same  milk,  mostly  distributed  by  two  major  retail 
chains. Most prices appears to be between nz$4.50 to nz$4.90, which is the range 




It should be noted that numerous factors other than supply management could also 
impact the capacity of a dairy farm to increase (or adjust) dairy output in order to attain 
optimal output levels. Interest rates, labour availability, environmental regulation, land 
and or feed availability, climate and other factors influence the profit maximizing output 
level and the capability to reach it (for a given output price). This explains why the 
average number of cows per dairy farms is 1,500 in Arizona and only 100 in Wisconsin, 
for example. 
In addition to the difficulties of making output adjustments that Canadian dairy farmers 
might  have,  they  might  also  have  lower  incentive  to  pursue  economies  of  scale
16. 
According to Mosheim and Lovell (2009), economies of scale are more important than 
technical and allocative efficiencies
17, and higher output price reduces the need to 
reach higher economies of scale. On this account, a relationship seems to exist between 
higher prices for farm milk in Canada and smaller dairy farms. The average dairy farm 
size in the United States is 139 cows versus 76 in Canada. Average farm size in smaller  
dairy states close to Canada are, for instance, 100 cows in Maine and over 200 in 
Vermont. Wisconsin has an average of 100 dairy cows per farm. More importantly, 
averages mask the fact that larger dairy farms account for an increasing percentage of 
total milk production in the United States. For instance, 23 per cent of the dairy farms in 
the US produce 85 per cent of the milk
18. The distribution of dairy farm size within 
Canadian regions seems much more uniform in terms of distribution around the mean 
than in the United States.  
                                                      
16 Economies of scale represent the cost advantage (reduction) associated with an expansion of 
production.  
17 Technical efficiency is to obtain the most production from available resources with a given technology, 
while allocative efficiency is the best mixed of inputs to produce an optimal level of output given input 
and output prices. One needs to be technically efficient to reach allocative efficiency. 
18 Jim Salfer, University of Wisconsin.  
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Table 5: Average Cow per Farm: US and Canada 
 
 
In summary, although in theory the incentive to reduce costs at the farm should be 
equivalent between a supply managed dairy sector and a non-supply managed system, 
the current difficulties to access quota that prevails in some provinces is unlikely to lead 
to this result; while higher milk price reduces the incentive to pursue economies of 
scale.    Based  on  this  partial  analysis,  it  appears  plausible  that  current  rules  in  the 
Canadian dairy sector create less possibilities and incentives for farmers to reduce costs 
compared with a non-supply managed system.  
Issue 4: 
Supply management is detrimental to dairy processors 
Facts: 
Dairy processing is concentrated among three large companies  in Canada: Parmalat 
Canada, an affiliate of the Italian multinational Parmalat SpA, Saputo, a Montreal-based 
multinational company and the Quebec-based Agropur, a cooperative that operates 
mainly in Canada, the United States and South America.   
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Saputo  and  Agropur  have  both  made  acquisitions  in  the  United  States  and  South 
America  over  the  last  decade.  Informa  Economic
19s  concluded  that  « (supply 
management) limited growth coupled with restriction on export volumes has limited 
opportunities to grow their dairy industry within Canadian borders and has led to mass 
investment in US dairy companies». Although the facts reported by Informa Economics 
are accurate, the relationship with supply management is debatable. The most visible 
example, Fonterra, which exports 95 per cent of New Zealand’s milk production, has 
invested in dairy farms, processing, and research and distribution facilities in more than 
140  countries
20. The relationship between lack of growth, supply management and 
international investment implied by Informa Economics, appears to be weak, at best. 
Nevertheless, Saputo’s CEO often mentions that growth possibilities are greater in the 
United  States  and  contends  that  supply  management  is  responsible  for  the  lower 
growth potential in Canada. The fact is that Saputo’s growth in the United States is 
mostly through acquisitions. Dairy processing in Canada is very concentrated with three 
major players processing roughly 80% of the milk. Thus, possibilities for acquisitions in 
Canada  are  very  limited.  On  the  other  hand,  some  financial  analysts
21  suggest that 
because of supply management, dairy processors in Canada are a good investment.   
Standards for cheese (Canada) and yogurt (Quebec), which set a minimum amount of 
fresh  milk  that  can  be  used  in  some  dairy  produ cts,  seem  to  be  an  irritant  for 
processors. In fact, Saputo and Kraft are currently challenging federal cheese standards 
in court. These standards are likely to affect profitability rather than growth, since the 
use of cheaper dairy ingredient imports (ins tead of fresh milk) does not appear to be 
reflected in retail prices
22.   
 
                                                      
19 Informa Economics, Inc. is an established consulting group specialized in broad-based domestic and 




21 According to the American financial analyst Brian Yarbrough: «The supply management system shelters 
the dairy industry from competition. There's not a lot of risk on the pricing side and it's a good margin 
business, so this is a good deal» The Gazette, October 23 2008. 
22 It is difficult to observe a price differentials between cheeses made with or without imported dairy 
ingredients at the retail level. However, a different pricing strategy might exist at the wholesale level.  
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Given the absence of a national system of milk allocation and average price setting 
(national  pooling  system),  it  is  likely  that  Canadian  dairy  processors  currently  have 
difficulties to reach a level of production that would maximize economies of scale. It is 
also  likely  that  provincial  instead  of  national  milk  allocation  results  in  sub -optimal 
resources utilizations by processors
23. The current system of milk allocation by specific 
plant for butter-powder, for instance, might also be resulting in a sub-optimal allocation 
of milk for more innovative or growth potential dairy products. Thus, the problem is not 
that there is not enough milk being produced, but is instead one of not having the right 
volume at the best possible place.  
One also has to recognize the greater difficulty for Canadian processors to make profits 
out of product innovation. Given the limited size of the Canadian domestic market and 
export restrictions, the important costs of product innovation have to borne by much 
lower quantities.  
Despite these challenges, Canadian processors have over the past few years reported 
solid financial results
24. This might be explained by the fact that supply management 
protects them from subsidized and non-subsidized international competition. The high 
market concentration (three major players) probably also contributes to this favorable 
performance.  
Issue 5:  
Canada is missing out on exports, especially on dairy consumption growth in 
developing countries 
Facts 
Critics  of  supply  management  contend  that  the  system  prevents  dairy  farmers  in 
Canada from taking advantage of export opportunities because it is geared towards the 
domestic market. The facts seem to be consistent with this view as Canada’s exports are 
mostly  linked  to  the  structural  surplus  of  SNF,  currently  in  the  form  of  skim  milk 
powder.  
                                                      
23 Plants need to be built to access milk in some provinces instead of increasing processing in provinces 
where plants already exist and could be optimized. 
24 Saputo and Agropur recently declared record high profits.   
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The  question  is  to  assess  what  opportunities  Canada  could  really  have  on  the 
international market if the market was liberalized. World dairy trade represents roughly 
less than ten per cent of global dairy production and the vast majority of dairy trade 
comprises dairy commodities such as butter, milk powder, cheese and dairy ingredients. 
For instance, dairy consumption in China (mostly in the form of fluid milk and milk 
powders) is growing quickly with gains of 10 per cent per year in its major cities. A look 
at U.S. dairy exports (Figure 6) confirms that. The exception is fluid milk and cream 
exported to Mexico by bordering states.  
Given that the competitive advantage in commodity markets is based on cost rather 
than differentiation, Canada’s potential in this market is not obvious. Canada cannot 
achieve the cost structure of New Zealand and Australia, which is based on extensive 
production (pasture based) and minimal infrastructure (capital investment). Similarly, 
Canada cannot compete with the cost structure of California, Arizona, New Mexico and 
Texas that can harvest alfalfa, a major feedstock, 10 to 12 times a year as opposed to 
two to three times in Canada. Moreover, Canada cannot use export subsidies like the 
United States and Europe given current trade rules.  
Figure 6: Breakdown of US dairy products exports, 2010 
 
Source: US Dairy Exports Council “U.S. Exports of Dairy Products - Volume - Mixed Units”. 
 
Currently,  supply  management  does  not  prevent  dairy  exports  but  it  limits  our 
subsidized exports and increases the price of farm milk, making commodity exports less  
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competitive. Canada has a special access to the U.S. cheese market for cheddar, swiss, 
emmental  and  other  cheese,  subject  to  a  tariff  rate  quota  (TRQ).  Moreover,  no 
constraint exists to export soft-ripened cheese such as Brie. It is interesting to look at 
how Canada has taken advantage of these opportunities. In 2009, Canada exported 2.8 
million kg of cheese to the US in this category
25.  In the same category, the EU (that 
does not benefit from a special access) exported 85.7 million kg of cheese for the same 
year. Therefore, it seems that Canada is not taking advantage of the fine cheese market 
potential  that  exists  in  the  United  States  even  within  the  confines  of  supply 
management. This might be attributable to the fact that major processors such as 
Saputo and Agropur do not appear to be interested in exporting fine cheeses given that 
they can produce them in their U.S. facilities. Smaller processors, which are at the 
center of the fine cheese development in Canada, are likely to find exports difficult 
given the administrative hurdles and the difficulties involved with exporting  relatively 
small  volumes.  However,  despite  these  drawbacks,  Canada  should  explore  more 
strategies to penetrate the U.S. market for high end value specialty cheese.  
In practice, these strategies would have to be geared around product differentiation 
and directed towards the U.S. where transportation costs are low relative to other 
distant  markets.  Specialty  cheese  seems  to  be  a  good  candidate.    It  has  a  low 
transportation cost relative to its value and given that it is a high value -added product, 
the relative importance of farm milk prices in the final cost of the product is smaller.  
In summary, dairy export opportunities would probably be limited even in the absence 
of supply management. The highly commoditized nature of dairy products traded and 
the higher production costs Canadian farmers naturally face are reasons suggesting that 
Canada’s export potential would be restrained. Nevertheless, Canadian producers can 
start by taking advantage of existing opportunities in the U.S. fine cheese market and 
could develop strategies that target value-added dairy markets. 
 
                                                      






Proposed Strategies to Explore 
 
t a Glance 
 
There  is  no  doubt  that  changes  to  supply  management  may  be  difficult  to 
achieve, especially from a political point of view. Nevertheless, our assessment 
is that dairy supply management would gain in becoming more flexible and 
efficient.  
A national centralized quota sale system would generate more transaction and 
also reallocate milk production within Canada more efficiently 
A national (pool) price for milk, coupled with allocation of quota based on 
demand, could also increase revenues for producers without raising prices 
To  reduce  the  surplus  of  solid  non-fat,  we  propose  to  change  current 
incentives and make the change a shared responsibility between processors 
and producers.  
Canadian dairy stakeholders should explore ways to penetrate the fine cheese 
U.S. market and other potential value added markets. 
The  previous  section  reveals  that  misconceptions  surrounding  the  impact  of  supply 
management on the Canadian dairy value chain exist. Nevertheless, some changes to 
supply management should be considered to meet the challenges that the Canadian 
dairy  industry  must  currently  contend  with.  In  this  section  a  number  of  potential 










Proposed Strategy: National Structures 
Limited access to quota is an important issue for dairy farmers in that it reduces their 
ability to grow and possibly reduce costs in the longer run. At the root of this problem is 
a provincial supply of quota that is inferior to provincial demand. This is true in all 
provinces and could be interpreted as an indication that dairy farm size is not optimal 
(given the important demand for quota, which amount to a demand for growth).  
Within the constraint of supply management, we recommend the creation of a national 
centralized  quota  sale  system  for  a  significant  share  of  the  national  quota  (market 
sharing quota)
26. A national centralized quota sale system would generate more volume 
to be traded and also reallocate milk production within Canada more efficiently.  
A national average milk price (national pool for all classes of milk), coupled with 
allocation of quota based on demand, could also increase   revenues for producers 
without raising prices
27. This might also improve the overall efficiency of processors 
since they will be in a better position to allocate milk between their processing plants 
across Canada. As a result, the fastest growing markets i n Canada would be served 
better  as  milk  and  capitals  would  move  more  freely.  Moreover,  as  mentioned 
previously, a national pool would require a national board that could also oversee  
transportation policy and reduce the costs of raw milk quality programs a s well as 
financing and other administrative costs.  
Proposed Strategy: Shared responsibility processors-producers to reduce SNF 
surplus.  
Another  key  issue  that  was  raised  in  the  previous  section  was  the  existence  of  a 
structural surplus of SNF. On one hand, dairy and non-dairy processors are importing 
dairy ingredients, contributing to the SNF structural surplus. On the other hand, dairy 
farmers receive very little for their SNF surpluses sold in special classes at low price.  
 
                                                      
26 If a k-double auction, an auction that simultaneously mediate among multiple buyers and seller, was to 
be used, it is possible that quota prices would start rising again. Therefore, different alternatives for a 
centralized quota sales system should be studied. This is beyond the scope of this paper. 
27 For example, if more milk is directed in the more lucrative class 2 instead of class 4, then the pool price 
is increased even if the price of each class remains the same.  
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Currently, it seems that processors have little incentive to reduce the SNF surplus for 
many reasons. First, the SNF surplus is the financial responsibility of Canadian milk 
producers.  Second,  processors  have  a  guaranteed  margin  for  butter  and  skim  milk 
powder that makes them reluctant to process different «residual» products, such as 
ingredients, since, for those products, margins are not guaranteed. Third, if a processor 
was to use Canadian dairy ingredients for cheese production, that processor would have 
to pay, according to current rules, the cheese class (3a) price
28. Fourth, these dairy 
ingredients imports are cheaper. 
Options to correct these disincentives should be explored. One option might be to share 
the responsibility among processors and producers of the SNF surplus over  a certain 
level. Another one would be to reduce the processors butter -powder guaranteed 
margin and/or to create a guaranteed margin for dairy ingredient processing. A third 
option would be to price Canadian dairy ingredient use for cheese production more 
competitively with imports. Given that the use of dairy ingredients in cheese is limited 
by Canadian standards, favoring Canadian ingredients makes even more sense. Those 
options could be applied in combination or simultaneously. 
It appears to be in the best interest of dairy farmers to work with processors to develop 
Canadian dairy ingredients. This has the potential to raise prices for special classes and 
thus increase farm price (pool price) without increasing the price of the major classes. 
Moreover, given that dairy farmers receive very little for a certain milk volume (special 
classes of milk) and that the SNF surplus represents a cost for them, it seems that there 
is currently room for improvement and negotiations with processors that import dairy 
ingredients.  
                                                      
28 As previously mentioned, cheese yield can be increased by substituting fresh milk by high protein milk 
powder (a dairy ingredient). Those high protein milk powder can be imported free of tariffs at low price. If 
a processor was to use Canadian high protein milk powder instead of imports, (which would help 
reducing Canada’s SNF surplus) it would have to pay them at the class 3a price, under current rule, which 
is roughly equivalent in terms of price to using fresh milk. This makes the use of Canadian dairy 
ingredients quite disadvantageous.    
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Proposed  Strategy:  Identify  Export  Opportunities  in  value  added  dairy 
products.  
A potential Doha outcome based on current draft modalities would result in greater 
dairy  imports  in  Canada.  To  prepare  for  this  possibility,  the  dairy  industry  could 
concentrate its efforts on Canadian dairy products differentiation in order to set them 
apart from the more intense competition. Steps  should also be taken to limit price 
increases for regular farm milk classes to ensure that the gap between domestic and 
international dairy prices does not widen further. It is worth noting that the larger the 
price  gap  between  world  and  domestic  price  for  dairy  products,  the  greater  the 
incentive  to flood  the Canadian  market  with  imported  goods  especially  if the  Doha 
Round results is sharply lower import tariffs on dairy products.   
It will be difficult for Canada to compete effectively in global dairy markets because of a 
higher structural cost of producing milk. Canadian dairy stakeholders should therefore 
explore ways to penetrate the fine cheese U.S. market and other value-added markets 
south of the border, even if these markets would not represent, at the time, great 
volumes  of  milk.  The  fine  cheese  industry  in  Canada  is  currently  characterized  by 
smaller  processors  that  need  to  coordinate  their  efforts.  The  need  to  reduce  the 
administrative costs of exporting and to add volume suggests that they would benefit 
by working together. This would also allow better access to distributors in the United 
States. Processors and producers should explore possible collaboration on this front. 
Researching and exploiting export markets where Canada has a competitive advantage 
should be a priority, especially in the current context where the Canadian market is 
mature and offers limited opportunity for growth. 
Summary of Proposed Strategies to Explore  
In summary, strategies that should be explored include  
  To adapt provincial and regional structures to a national market: 
o  The creation of a national board, 
o  The creation of a national pool with a national allocation of milk on 
demand; 
o  The creation of a national centralized quota exchange for partial share of 
the MSQ.  
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  To change processors incentives toward SNF surplus: 
o  The creation of a mechanism to share the cost of SNF surpluses between 
producers and processors over and above a certain level of surplus; 
o  To reduce processors margins for butter-powder and/or to create one for 
dairy ingredients; 
o  To change class pricing so that the use of Canadian dairy ingredients 
would not be priced at class 3a but would be more competitive with the 
price of imports. 
  To see Canadian dairy exports differently: 
o  To identify and explore ways to exploit value added export markets 
where Canada might have a competitive advantage; 
o  To coordinate and facilitate, in the short run, the effort of smaller fine 
cheese producers to penetrate the fine cheese market in the U.S., which 
is currently partially deserved by French imports.  
  To  increases  dairy  farmers  revenues  through  an  increase  in  pool  price  and 
volumes, instead of an increase in regular milk classes (class 1 to 4). This could 
be  achieved  through  different  combinations  of  the  previous  suggestions  and 









airy supply management system has been severely criticized by many observers 
both  within  and  outside  of  Canada  and  strongly  defended  by  proponents. 
Although some of the criticisms are founded, others do not stand up to the facts. At the 
same time, dairy supply management faces important issues. These include access to 
quota,  dairy  ingredients  and  a  solid  non-fat  structural  surplus,  a  need  for  national 
allocation of milk and trade negotiation such as the Doha round.  
We propose a number of strategies to be explore, that we believe would improve the 
flexibility and efficiency of dairy supply management in Canada. The development of a 
national pool and the allocation of milk on demand, for instance, could improve the 
efficiency of the industry by enabling a better allocation of milk. This could potentially 
improve  plant  utilization,  processors  efficiency  and  raise  dairy  farmers’  revenues 
without  increasing  the  price  of  the  major  classes  of  milk.  Other  suggestions  are  a 
national board, a national centralized quota exchange, changes in processors incentives 
to favour the development of Canadian dairy ingredients as well as exploring export 
opportunities for value added dairy products.  These suggestions also have the potential 
to improve dairy supply management in Canada and to reinforce the competitiveness of 
the  Canadian  value  chain,  which  would  help  the  industry  meet  the  increased 
competition from dairy imports.  
Hopefully, this report will move the discussion on Canadian dairy supply management 
forward and help initiate a constructive dialogue among stakeholders that will lead to a 
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